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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, growing economic globalisation has been accompanied by rising 
social support for market systems as a means of managing resource-use. In turn, the 
free market movement considers definite and secure property rights (especially 
private rights and, sometimes, communal rights) in resources to be the necessary basis 
for a desirable market system. Global policies for managing the Earth’s genetic 
resources have been influenced by this approach. As outlined in this article, there has 
been a global expansion of property rights in genetic resources, and further extensions 
have been advocated. In order to assess the possible social benefits and costs of 
granting property rights in genetic resources, these are classified. This classification is 
shown to be useful in discussing economic and legal reasons for granting or denying 
property rights in genetic resources. Furthermore, this classification is demonstrated 
to be pertinent to the consideration of market failures that may accompany the 
granting of property rights in genetic resources and which limit the potential social 
economic benefits from establishing property rights in these resources. It is concluded 
that many of those who advocate the management of genetic resources by means of 
secure property rights and market systems have been overly optimistic about the 
economic potential of this policy, its social benefits, its impact on the conservation of 
biodiversity, and its workability. There is a need for more informed debate on these 
matters before concluding that wholesale global extension of property rights in 
genetic material is desirable. In addition to the above, this paper compares and 
assesses the approach on property rights in wildlife and nature adopted in the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) with that 
advocated in the international Convention on Biological Diversity. 
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1. Introduction  
Liberal economic philosophy, involving the use of market systems and private 
property rights, has come to dominate thinking about economic policy globally. As a 
result, there has been growing support for the global creation of (or recognition of) 
private property rights and communal property rights in genetic resources (Bhat, 
1999; Swanson, 1997) and for these resources to be managed by market operations 
rather than by government regulation, or for this policy to be adopted in some cases as 
an alternative to global open-access to genetic resources. Advocates of this policy 
foresee several advantages for it compared to alternative policies. They consider that 
this approach is likely to be more effective than its alternatives in conserving genetic 
resources, will be more efficient in the utilization of such resources, and that it will 
strongly encourage ‘improvements’ in the genetic resource base, for example, the 
development of new plant varieties and new breeds of livestock. In addition, some 
argue that this approach will promote distributive justice by ensuring that a larger 
share of the economic returns or rents from the use of genetic resources flows to the 
guardians or the developers of these resources. 
The matter is, however, quite complex. There is a danger that such policies may be 
‘oversold’. In several circumstances, because of inescapable market failures, such 
policies can prove to be less supportive of the conservation of biodiversity and less 
efficient in managing genetic resources than is claimed by their supporters. 
Furthermore, in some instances, their fairness is open to question (cf. Jugale, 2005). 
The purpose of this essay is to provide an assessment of these matters. 
This is done by first noting some changes in the nature of international policies 
governing economic rights in genetic resources and considering how these can be 
related to a classification of natural assets. Then a variety of reasons for favouring 
private or communal property rights in genetic resources are outlined and these are 
compared with reasons sometimes given in support of intellectual property rights, 
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such as those rights granted by the issue of patents. The next section of this essay 
explores how market failures can undermine the rationale given for favouring 
property rights in genetic material and the marketing of this material. The penultimate 
section contrasts the policy approach taken to markets and property rights in CITES 
with that favoured in the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
 
2. Global Development in Legal Rights in Genetic Material  
Globally there is now much greater legal recognition of property rights in genetic 
resources than in the middle of the 20th century. Developments that have extended 
property rights in genetic material include the UPOV (Union international pour la 
Protection des Obtentions Vegetales) Convention. In English, this is the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties. This convention came into 
effect in 1961 and provides international legal property rights in new plant varieties 
(involving ‘improved’ genetic material) to plant breeders who develop these varieties 
and register these with the relevant authorities. These rights are recognised by nations 
that are signatories to the UPOV Convention. The UPOV Convention was revised in 
1972, 1978 and 1991. Its objective is to protect those who develop new varieties of 
plants by granting international intellectual property rights in these. The 1991 revision 
of the UPOV Convention allows for the granting of patent rights in new plant 
varieties. Jugale (2005) argues that this is very unfavourable to less developed 
countries.  
Originally, the granting of property rights in new plant varieties was rejected by 
developing nations. They felt that it was economically unjust to them because 
germplasm was often taken free of charge from developing countries, ‘improved’ in 
more developed countries to produce more desirable varieties of plants, and these in 
turn were liable to be sold back to developing countries at high prices and without 
recognising the benefit obtained by the developer as a result of using the original 
germplasm from developing countries. 
“In 1986 this controversy resulted in the adoption of the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) in which the developing world agreed to recognise 
the legitimacy of the concept of plant breeders’ rights in return for the creation of a 
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reciprocal concept termed ‘Farmer’s Rights’…These are rights granted in recognition 
of the contributions of farmers toward the conservation of genetic resources for use in 
the plant breeding and seed industries generally” (Swanson, 1997, p.102). While this 
has been internationally agreed to in principle, and the possibility has been aired of a 
body such as the FAO collecting funds for farmers and distributing these to relevant 
nations and for these nations to allocate these in turn to their relevant farmers, this 
agreement has not yet been implemented (Swanson, 1997, p.102). With the legal 
recognition international property rights in genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
developing countries have expressed additional concerns about lack of payment to 
them for the rents obtained from genetically modified crops, such as GM soya beans 
(Xue et al., 2004). GMOs have been given international patent protection but in many 
cases, the organisms that have been genetically modified have their origins in 
developing countries. 
Jugale (2005) outlines legislation that has been passed in India to protect farmers’ 
rights in genetic material. He argues that the UPOV Convention is unfavourable to 
less developed countries and is concerned about the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement which requires all WTO members to legislate to 
protect new plant varieties. 
In no jurisdictions are property rights granted in naturally occurring organisms. 
Currently, exclusive marketing rights are only granted when “it is demonstrated that 
human intervention has produced an organism that was not previously existing in 
nature” (Swanson, 1997, p.103). However, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
which came into effect in the 1990s opens the way for the granting of property rights 
in naturally occurring genetic resources. Swanson (1997, p.105) has argued strongly 
in favour of the granting of property rights in naturally occurring genetic material. He 
believes that bias in the legal system has undermined the conservation of natural 
genetic stocks. He states: “In essence, the legal system has contrived to treat the 
informational products of nature as ‘open access’. And thus the only appropriable 
genetic information is that which results from human intervention. Again, such a bias 
actively discourages any investment in the maintenance of the stocks of natural 
genetic capital, instead of encouraging the development of capital stocks that are 
compatible with the international property rights structure” (Swanson, 1997, p.105). 
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Swanson (1997) also maintains that property rights regimes and greater international 
trade in wildlife and their products (the products of natural genetic material) are likely 
to be more supportive of wildlife conservation than restrictions on such trade. The 
latter approach has been adopted in the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) as a measure to conserve endangered species. 
Swanson’s attitude seems to have been influenced by his joint study of bans on trade 
in ivory (Barbier et al., 1990). The Convention on Biological Diversity, in contrast 
and to some extent in conflict with CITES, appears to be supportive of the type of 
approach recommended by Swanson (1997). However, as Tisdell (2006) points out, 
Swanson’s preferred approach is only likely to be effective in conserving some 
wildlife species. Globally, many economically valued species (for example, those 
only with high non-use economic values) are likely to disappear if such an approach is 
adopted unless they are conserved in protected areas. Unfortunately, due to market 
failures (missing markets or partial markets), private and communal property rights 
regimes combined with marketing of genetic materials and natural products often do 
not result in a socially optimal outcome nor the best attainable one. 
 
3. Classification of Genetic Material and Related Property Rights 
The development of private and communal property rights in genetic resources are in 
a state of flux. In general, property rights have only been firmly assigned to legal 
entities able to show that they have developed organisms that do not occur in nature. 
Furthermore, such rights have been agreed on internationally in principle for farmers 
who have communally or otherwise over long periods of time evolved organisms that 
would not have evolved without their intervention or which would not have survived 
without their intervention. Nevertheless, a similar mechanism to provide 
compensation for use of genetic material has not been considered for hunters and 
gatherers who may also have, in a somewhat similar manner, conserved or even to a 
limited extent developed genetic material. In principle, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity makes such rights and compensation possible.  
Nations are increasingly claiming global property rights in indigenous genetic 
material. These rights cannot be enforced retrospectively, but could be enforced in 
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relation to future global use of indigenous genetic material not previously known to be 
useful and which are still contained within a country’s borders. 
Retrospective enforcement by a government of property rights in indigenous genetic 
material that has already been distributed internationally as a result of previous open 
access does not appear to be a practical nor a legal possibility. Most nations now have 
obtained, as a result of open access, genetic material from many other nations without 
payment for using the genetic resources involved. For example, soya beans were 
introduced to the USA from Asia and maize was introduced from the Americas to 
most other countries of the world, including India. Similarly, the potato. The list of 
such introductions is in fact very long. To give an Australian example, the macadamia 
nut Macadamia intergrifolia is a native of southern Queensland and northern New 
South Wales. Although it is now cultivated in Australia, cultivation in Australia did 
not begin until 1963. Cultivation first commenced in the United States in Hawaii in 
the early 1900s using seed exported from Australia (Low, 1991, p. 92). No payment 
was made for access to this Australian genetic resource. The potential commercial 
value of the resource would have still been uncertain in the early 1900s. Furthermore, 
Australia has probably obtained reverse economic benefits from the development of 
macadamia nuts as a cultivated crop in Hawaii. 
In order to envisage the type of property rights that have been or could be granted in 
genetic resources, it is useful to classify genetic resources in a systematic manner. 
This is done in Figure 1. As a first approximation, genetic resources or assets may be 
divided into those that produce organisms that occur naturally (Set A) and those that 
produce organisms that have not evolved naturally but are the product of human 
intervention in natural processes (Set B). The latter (Set B) can be further subdivided 
into organisms that have evolved, often by co-evolution and communal activities, as a 
result of efforts of several generations of human beings. Designate this as set C. 
Farmers’ rights are being sought for genetic material in this set, C. In practice, it may 
be difficult to decide whether some organisms belong to set A or C. For example, the 
genetic composition of some wild species is altered by human activities. Set D covers 
new organisms that have been produced in modern times by legal entities 
manipulating or selecting genetic material to produce organisms that previously did 
not exist. A legal entity is able to obtain legal rights in such genetic material via plant 
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variety rights or patents, for example, for GMOs, depending on the nature of the 
genetic change. 
 
STOCK OF GENETIC RESOURCES 
A 
Naturally 
occurring 
organisms  
B 
Organisms that do 
not occur naturally 
but are a result of 
human intervention 
Legal entities 
and 
communities 
not given 
property rights 
Some nations claim property 
rights for a subset of such 
organisms as a result of the 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
Farmers’ rights agreed to in 
principle but not implemented
Global property rights via 
plant variety rights and 
patents 
C 
Organisms that have evolved 
over a long period involving 
several human generations, 
communal sharing, and 
usually co-evolution 
D 
New organisms produced by a 
legal entity in modern times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  A classification of the stock of genetic resources and associated legal 
regimes of property rights in genetic resources. 
 
Currently, global property rights in genetic material are biased in favour of set D. 
Higher income nations have the lead in developing this material. Farmers’ rights have 
not yet been supported effectively. Legal entities or social groups have not yet been 
granted international legal rights in the genetic material contained in natural 
organisms but several nations now claim such rights, an outcome supported by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Thus, current property rights in genetic material 
are patchy and show bias in favour of Set D in Figure 1. It is, therefore, useful to 
consider why this bias may exist and to consider the reasons often given to justify 
property rights in genetic resources. 
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4. Reasons for Granting or Denying Property Rights in Genetic Resources 
Legal views about the granting of property rights in genetic resources appear to have 
been strongly influenced by earlier practices in relation to intellectual property, 
particularly patents. Patents provide the patentee with a legal monopoly in a new 
invention for several years. 
A variety of arguments have been advanced in favour of patent systems (Tisdell, 
1972, Ch. 20). These include the following: (1) these systems provide an economic 
incentive for advances in applied intellectual knowledge and hence promote economic 
growth; and (2) they provide a reward for effort in research and development. In the 
opinion of some, this is just, and the granting of property rights in genetic material in 
category D in Figure 1 satisfies these considerations. Nevertheless, the economic 
benefit from greater technical or scientific progress as a result of the patent system has 
to be weighed against the social economic deadweight loss resulting from the grant of 
a monopoly in the invention for a specified period (Tisdell, 1972, Ch. 20). This means 
that greater technical or scientific progress does not in itself provide sufficient 
justification for patent systems, and in particular, for granting patents for GMOs 
(Tisdell and Wilson, 2004). 
The main rationale for giving entities property rights in genetic stock in category C 
appears to be not so much that it will lead to further advances in intellectual 
knowledge but that it would reward past efforts and may encourage the conservation 
of this genetic material. However, this raises the question of for how long such 
property rights should be granted. If they are granted in perpetuity, this would differ 
from the practice adopted in relation to the granting of property rights in genetic 
material in category D. These rights are only granted for a finite period of time. In any 
case, much of the conservation and development of genetic resources in category C 
would have been undertaken by local people and communities for their own benefit. 
Past actions in this regard would not have been motivated by the possibility of 
obtaining outside rewards from these activities. Any such reward would, therefore, be 
an unanticipated economic bonus. 
In relation to the granting of property rights to local communities or to national 
governments for genetic material in category A, an acceptable reason cannot be that it 
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is an economic reward for the effort of adding to intellectual capital. A possible 
rationale, however, is that it is an economic reward or incentive for conserving natural 
capital (compare Swanson, 1997). However, in many cases, payments arising as a 
result of such rights would constitute a rent because some (or much of) the pool of 
natural genetic resources in category A may be conserved incidentally rather than 
deliberately. In addition, it should be noted that the original endowment of genetic 
resources in a geographical area is not controlled by human beings but is due to 
chance or the original creation of these.  
It is always difficult to get agreement on the choice of actions that are just. However, 
the free transfer of genetic material in categories A and C could be justified on the 
lines of one of Talmudic principles of a social improvement, namely that the free 
transfer results in a Paretian improvement, that is the transfer makes at least one or 
more of the parties better off without reducing the benefits of any. This principle is 
well discussed and illustrated by Ohrenstein (2007) taking an example involving 
house rent from the Talmudic literature. Cases undoubtedly exist where the free 
transfer of genetic material has not deprived the party from which it is taken of any 
pre-existing benefits from use of this material but has provided economic benefits to 
the recipients which they otherwise would not have. This implies that a Paretian gain 
occurs. In addition, it is possible that those who obtain the genetic material free of 
charge ‘improve’ the material or conserve a species (organism) which would become 
extinct in its place of origin. This may result in reciprocal economic benefits to those 
who originally possessed the genetic material. While this may not occur in every case, 
a Paretian improvement is very likely to occur in many cases. Talmudic principles 
indicate that in such cases, compensation need not be paid. 
The argument for free exchange of genetic material in categories A and C may be 
further reinforced if the Kaldor-Hicks principle (the potential Paretian improvement) 
criterion is applied. First, the lack of payment for genetic transfer in categories A and 
C will eliminate transaction costs. This is an advantage because they involve non-
productive expenditure. Secondly, the extension in use of the genetic resources will 
widen the economic benefits obtained. Thirdly, to some extent, any gains and losses 
of individual nations from genetic transfers tend to cancel out. For example, although 
the Americas gained from the introduction of soya beans from East Asia, East Asia 
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gained from the introduction of maize from the Americas. Similarly, India has had 
many economic benefits from genetic material introduced from the Americas, for 
example, potatoes and chillies and no payments have been made for these transfers. 
It is clear that different economic reasons need to be advanced to support the granting 
of property rights in different types of genetic resources and that the granting of 
property rights in all genetic resources is difficult to justify ethically. Given the degree 
of support globally for property rights regimes and the use of markets, the question 
needs to be asked of how effective this approach is likely to be in conserving 
biodiversity and to what extent the possible economic benefits of this approach are 
likely to be limited by market failures. Let us consider this matter. 
 
5. Market Failures and Transaction Costs Restrict Social Benefits from 
Property Rights in Genetic Resources 
The potential for using patent systems and property rights in genetic resources to 
provide social benefits is limited by several types of market failure. The effective 
operation of such systems rely on those who are granted property rights being able to 
appropriate a significant proportion of economic benefits from the genetic resources 
involved. The ability of holders of property rights in genetic material to appropriate 
economic benefit is likely to be greatest when use value constitutes a high proportion 
of the total economic value of such material, that is, when private goods are mainly 
produced by such material. Conversely, other things equal, the higher is non-use value 
as a proportion of the total economic value of genetic material, the less is the ability of 
economic entities to appropriate economic benefits from it. In such cases, a high 
public good element is present. Thus, the property rights method in genetic material is 
likely to favour the conservation of genetic resources producing private goods in 
comparison to goods with high public good component. The concepts of total value of 
use value and non-use value are outlined and discussed in Tisdell (2005, pp.110-113) 
and useful examples are given in Ninan (2007, Ch.7) 
Secondly, the granting of property rights in genetic material usually takes no account 
of any externalities generated. For example, the granting of patent rights in a GMO or 
property rights in a new plant variety depends merely on whether the GMO or new 
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plant variety constitutes a novel organism. The body granting such rights does not 
take account of any externalities that might be generated by its use. It is usually the 
function of other public bodies to take account of possible adverse environmental 
externalities from new organisms and limit their use if necessary. Fears exist that such 
screening processes may prove to be inadequate and could result in new organisms 
being used which yield high private economic returns to business but generate 
significant adverse environmental externalities. For example, one such concern is that 
genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crops will give rise to herbicide-resistant 
weeds (Tisdell and Wilson, 2003). 
Market transactions and legal proceedings usually involve costs and these can be quite 
high in the case of property rights in genetic material (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). 
Transaction costs limit the scope for economically using market and legal systems for 
determining economic activity, and this applies to their use for using and developing 
genetic resources. For example, the transaction costs involved in ensuring Farmers’ 
Rights might be so high that little economic benefit is received by farmers entitled to 
such rights (see Tisdell, 2005, Ch.5). Individual farmers and groups of farmers may 
not be able to afford the upfront costs that need to be incurred to enforce their legal 
property rights in genetic material. Enforcement involves social costs. First search is 
needed to detect if rights have been breached. These monitoring costs can be 
considerable. Secondly, evidence must be collected to support any claim of a breach. 
This further adds to cost. Then negotiations may begin with the party or parties 
accused of not respecting property rights. Again, this involves an economic cost and 
the outcome is uncertain. If negotiations fail, then the step of commencing Court 
action may be taken. Once again, this can be costly and the outcome uncertain. The 
situation is further complicated by free-riding problems and the costs of organizing 
collective action (Tisdell, 1996, Ch.8). This is because some of the potential 
beneficiaries from legal action may not contribute to its cost. They may, however, 
indirectly obtain an economic benefit if a plaintiff obtains a favourable judgment. This 
is because the judgment provides a precedent for others in a similar situation to the 
plaintiff. The possibility of class legal actions reduces the above mentioned problem 
to some extent but not entirely. 
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Another possibility is for governments to act on behalf of their farmers and other 
citizens (at least internationally) to enforce property rights in genetic material that 
otherwise would be unlikely to be enforced. The question then arises in these cases of 
whether payment for the use of the genetic material should be by intergovernment 
transfer. In any case, this approach is likely to involve significant costs for public 
administration. As a result, all or most of the sum available for transfer may be spent 
on the public service. Little if any of the funds may find their way to those who have 
helped conserve the genetic resources involved. Consequently, little equitable purpose 
would be served by the scheme. Furthermore, such schemes may turnout to be wealth-
reducing rather than wealth-creating. 
Where property rights in the use of genetic material can be enforced, this creates a 
monopoly. As a result, monopoly pricing is likely to occur. This results in human 
wants being less fully satisfied than is possible with the available resources. In other 
words, it is a source of Paretian economic inefficiency (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008, 
Ch.8). A special case is, therefore, required to justify this monopoly pricing from an 
economic point of view. For example, it is possible that the rate of technological 
progress and innovation may be stimulated by a temporary monopoly and this could 
make for lower economic scarcity in the future (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008, Chs. 8 and 
9). In the type of situation being considered here, it may be that monopoly pricing is 
required to provide sufficient incentive to conserve the relevant genetic material. 
However, there are likely to be cases where this material would be conserved at a 
price lower than the monopoly price for its use. In such circumstances, charging a 
monopoly price would not be justifiable from an economic point of view. 
Furthermore, the transaction costs involved in marketing genetic material and 
protecting private property rights in it favours very large corporations because 
economies of scale occur in transaction costs. Small firms are liable to be at a 
disadvantage in enforcing their property rights in genetic material. Therefore, a 
property right system for genetic material is likely to be relatively more beneficial to 
big business compared to small firms, including farmers. 
Also it is possible that a system of property rights in genetic material may reduce 
biodiversity. For example, genetic items in category D involve additions to the genetic 
stock, that is, they involve the creation of new organisms. However, if these are 
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commercially successful organisms, they are liable to replace or displace existing 
organisms. Thus, the composition of the genetic stock alters. Both natural genetic 
diversity and existing genetic diversity due to human intervention could conceivably 
be reduced. There is a risk that commercially successful new organisms, such as some 
GMOs, could reduce rather than add to biodiversity. This is the fear of some 
conservationists, many of whom in turn are worried that this reduction in biodiversity 
might threaten economic sustainability. 
Even in cases where genetic property rights do not legally exist, for example, for 
wildlife, some economists, for instance Swanson (1997), and conservation  groups 
(IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991) advocate the granting of property rights to local 
communities or individuals in harvested wildlife and want greater international trade 
in this wildlife and its products. They favour the concept of conservation of wildlife 
by means of sustainable use. If such a strategy is successful, it will also conserve the 
genetic material inherent in this wildlife. Tisdell (2006) argues that while such an 
approach can be effective in conserving some species, it will fail to do so for many 
species, even when they have high economic value if this value is principally a result 
of a high non-use value. Non-use values involve attributes that are characteristic of 
pure public goods. Once again, the property rights approach, when combined with 
market guidance, is shown to be subject to shortcomings as a conservation measure. 
In addition, even when private property rights are established in a wildlife species 
which has use value, this may not be favourable to the conservation of biodiversity 
generally as is pointed out in Tisdell (2004a). For example, when landholders are 
granted rights in wild species for hunting purposes, they sometimes kill species that 
prey on game in which they have property rights. They may also alter landscapes to 
favour their game to the disadvantage of other wild species. In other words, the 
landholder has an incentive to engage in activities which favour the conservation of a 
game species if it is profitable to do so, and these activities can involve the destruction 
of other species. 
Furthermore, there is not always public support for use of species as a conservation 
measure. Tisdell et al. (2007) found from a survey in Australia that most members of 
the public surveyed were opposed to the use, particularly the commercial use, of 
endangered species as a measure intended to support their conservation.  
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6. The Effectiveness for Biodiversity Conservation of the Policies Followed in 
CITES and Those Favoured by the Convention on Biological Diversity 
CITES and the Convention on Biological Diversity adopt different types of economic 
policies in their attempts to conserve biodiversity. The former restricts international 
trade in endangered species as a policy for conserving them. Trade restrictions make it 
less profitable to harvest the species. The latter convention seeks to encourage the use 
and commercial use of species in the expectation that it will become economically 
worthwhile for individuals to use them. This in turn it is believed, will provide 
economic incentives to groups and individuals to conserve their stock. It can be 
shown that in some cases, CITES policy can be an effective conservation measure, in 
other cases the types of policies favoured by the Convention on Biological Diversity 
are effective and there are still other situations in which neither set of polices is 
effective in conserving biodiversity. 
CITES policies can be effective in helping to conserve species to which there is open 
access either legally or in practice. CITES polices reduce the size of the market for 
endangered harvested wildlife. This makes it less profitable to harvest the species 
concerned and in normal circumstances reduces harvesting pressure on the species. In 
turn, this should lead to an increase in their population. This assumes that the standard 
economic theory of the exploitation of open-access resources applies as is, for 
example, outlined in Tisdell (2005, Ch. 6; 2009, Ch. 4). It should also be noted that 
these are species that have use value. 
This policy is ineffective in saving species that have no or little economic use value 
(but considerable non-use values) which may become endangered by habitat loss due 
to its transformation by human activity, for example, conversion of their natural 
habitat to farm land. It is also ineffective in cases where species become endangered 
due to human beings out competing them for the use of resources that are vital to the 
continuing existence of the species. Note that species that have a low or zero 
economic use value may have a high non-use value and therefore, a high total 
economic value. Even when individuals have property rights in such species, they 
have no economic incentive to conserve them because they cannot obtain a payment 
for the non-use value of the species concerned. 
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There is also a problem with the CITES policy approach when farming and/or 
ranching of a wildlife species can result in its conservation. Bans and restrictions on 
international trade proved to be an economic impediment to the development of the 
farming of saltwater crocodiles (Crocodylus porosus) which were once listed as 
endangered. Due to improved conservation management, the development of the 
farming of such crocodiles combined with payments to landholders for crocodile eggs 
and juveniles collected from their properties in the Northern Territory of Australia, the 
population of saltwater crocodiles have increased substantially in Australia 
(particularly in the Northern Territory) and the species is no longer endangered (Webb 
and Manolis, 1989). 
The development of the farming of sea turtles has been hampered due to restrictions 
on international trade imposed by CITES. For example, the development of the 
closed-cycle farming of green turtles (Chelonia mydas) in the Cayman Islands was 
hampered by restrictions of CITES on international trade in green turtles and products 
derived from them. Similarly, the development of the farming of hawksbill turtles 
(Eretmochelys imbricata) faces impediments and extra economic difficulties due to 
restrictions by CITES on international trade in these species and products derived 
from them (Tisdell et al., 2007). Difficulties in social management of the conservation 
of the above mentioned species have arisen because they have simultaneously been 
subject to open-access harvesting and attempts to develop ranching and farming 
possibilities potentially supportive of their conservation.  
The policy approach favoured in the Convention on Biological Diversity is much 
more supportive of efforts to conserve species by farming them or by ranching them 
effectively. The latter involves collecting eggs or juveniles from the wild and rearing 
them in captivity. This can increase survival rates and if combined with a payment to 
landholders where the eggs or juveniles are collected, can provide an economic 
incentive to landholders to conserve the species. However, the payment has to be high 
enough to provide sufficient economic incentive for landholders to adopt conservation 
measures actively. It can also provide some compensation to landholders for 
tolerating the relevant species if the species protected by law and are a pest to 
landholders (see for example, Tisdell et al., 2005). 
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In the case of species that have sufficient use or market value and in which property 
rights can be effectively enforced, the commercial use approach favoured by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity has merit. For example, if the value of products 
derived from the African elephant, such as ivory, hides and meat, is high enough, 
governments in Africa will find it economically worthwhile to conserve elephants in 
their reserves and protected areas. The funds received from the sales of such products 
enables governments to police and manage these areas in order to profit from the 
elephants and other wildlife there. This will result in more effective conservation of 
the African elephant as was pointed out by Swanson (1997) and the incidental 
conservation of other species. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness for biodiversity conservation of the approach 
advocated in the Convention on Biological Diversity depends on the possibility of 
economically establishing property rights in the species concerned. These rights may 
be private property rights, common-property rights or state rights. However, the 
approach will not be effective as a conservation measure if open access to the species 
occurs. Unfortunately, it is not always possible politically or economically to create 
property rights of the type just mentioned. 
There are also species that cannot be profitably conserved even if property rights are 
established in these. Both CITES and the Convention on Biological Diversity do not 
address these cases. The conservation of these species can only be assured by 
collective or state action. This may involve for example the establishment of national 
parks and protected areas. 
Therefore, it is apparent that the conservation of biodiversity calls for a mixture of 
public policies. Both market related policies and non-market policies are called for 
and the circumstances of individual cases need to be evaluated. At the same time, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that the greatest threat to the conservation of 
biodiversity is continuing economic growth driven by the desire for high levels of per 
capita income combined with rising levels of human population on a global scale. 
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7. Concluding Comments 
The new global policy approach favouring the granting of private, communal, or in 
some cases, national property rights in genetic resources is not likely to be as effective 
a policy for promoting conservation of biodiversity, overcoming failures in genetic 
resource use, and promoting sustainable economic growth, as its strongest advocates 
claim. Furthermore, this approach is limited in its capacity to ensure a just distribution 
of economic benefits from the conservation and development of genetic resources. 
It is important to be aware of such limitations because they have institutional 
implications. The main implication is that it is dangerous to entrust the conservation 
and development of genetic resources solely to the private sector. It is necessary for 
the public sector to play a significant role in the stewardship of genetic resources and 
the development of these resources. The exact role that the public sector should play 
needs investigation. A step towards this (as has been done here) is to demonstrate that 
the private sector cannot be expected to husband and develop genetic resources in an 
ideal manner because it is bound to exhibit predictable economic biases and 
shortcomings. 
Both the conservation policies of CITES and those favoured by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity relate to organisms (or their products) that are or can be 
marketed. CITES seeks to conserve genetic material by restricting the use of markets 
for endangered wildlife and the product derived from them. On the other hand, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity favours the creation of markets as a means for 
conserving genetic material. But not all valued genetic material can be marketed. 
Hence neither of these approaches provides a complete answer to conserving the 
desired stock of biodiversity (see Tisdell, 2004b). Additional non-market 
mechanisms, such as the United Nations’ Global Environmental Facility are needed. 
Furthermore, human beings need to moderate their economic demands on the 
biosphere if further substantial losses in biodiversity are to be avoided. These losses 
include biodiversity loss from rapid global warming. As is well known, this is a 
consequence of rising concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (such as 
CO2) which is attributable to the type of economic growth that has been experienced 
since the Industrial Revolution. Many policies for fine tuning biodiversity 
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conservation risk being swamped by biodiversity losses due to global economic 
growth. 
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